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A quote of The Secret of the West by Volodymyr Poselskyy in a paper on the geographical limits of Europe and the enlargement of the European Union, published on 13 July 2004 in Eurojournal, a Moldovan online journal (shortcut to page 4).
(Volodymyr Poselskyy, “The Frontiers of Europe and the Wider Europe Strategy” in Eurojournal, 13Jul2004, Moldova).
Safety copy Sep 06. Source (pdf).

The Secret of the West
Cosandey



1 The Frontiers of Europe and the Wider Europe Strategy Volodymyr POSELSKYY

Volodymyr Poselskyy
Eurojournal.org, July 2004
_____________________________________________________________________________________
1
The Frontiers of Europe and the Wider Europe Strategy
Volodymyr POSELSKYY
Ph. D. candidate at CERI, Sciences Po, Paris
______________________________________________________________________________
“The delimitation of Europe requires studying
geography, taking into account history and adopting a
political decision”
Hubert Védrine, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs
(on the eve of the European Council Meeting in
Helsinki, December 1999)
The Berlin Wall collapse posed a complicated dilemma for the European Economic Community
of the time. Based on the institutionally fixed principle of the openness of the European
integration
1
, the EEC and, later, the European Union of 15 members were a priori to have rapidly
enlarged in the course of time admitting all new European democracies in the East of the
continent, which desired to join the Union and were capable of adopting the acquis
communautaire. At the same time, such an enlargement unique by its scale would have
influenced significantly both the European integrational project in general and the interest of
particular member states, due to the fact that it would introduce considerable alterations to the
existing balance of power within the frames of the Community, require profound institutional
reforming and further narrowing the right to veto granted to every state, adjusting common
policies and redistributing the budgets in favour of new members. In that case, the process of
europeanisation of the former “socialist camp” would not necessarily have led to the full
institutional admission of the Central and East European countries (CEECs) to the EU. It would
probably have limited itself to a close assosiation within the frames of the established European
Economic Area. Staging such a scenario would have allowed the EU countries to enjoy the
advantages provided by the trade liberalization and the investment possibilities in the CEECs
avoiding painful institutional and budget adjustments which could have resulted from the
enlargement itself. In other words, the European Union could have felt satisfied with the
democratic and economic stabilization of its Eastern periphery through expanding a considerable
part of acquis communautaire on it without jeopardizing either the efficacy and internal integrity
of the European integration process or evident budget and political benefits for particular member
states.
A bit later it became obvious that the European community had chosen the way of integral
settling the issues of enlargement, which presupposed, on the one hand, some preliminary
internal adaptation and accommodation of its present member-states’ interests, and on the other
hand, a step-by-step admission of the CEECs required by sticking to the determined criteria and
longlasting transition periods.
At present the first stage of “the third unification of the continent” (Pomian, 1990) is heading to
its logical completion. May 1 2004 will be the date when the EU-15 will welcome 8 post-
communist states of Central Europe and the Baltic region the reformatory governments of which
Volodymyr Poselskyy
Eurojournal.org, July 2004
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2
have been following the course of consistent political and economic reforms and accession to the
Eropean Union since the initial point (with some cution concerning Slovakia, Lithuania and
Latvia). The enlarged Union of 25 members (including Cyprus and Malta) is planning to adopt
the first Constitutional Treaty which will crown the formation period for the European Union as a
qualitatively new institutional and political model of the integration process. It is obvious that the
EU prospective enlargement to the East has become not only the incentive for internal
resructuring in the CEECs, but also the efficient tool for restructuring the European Community
itself.
The consistent geopolitical transformation of the Old continent is not reduced to the EU’s
absorbing its closest Eastern and North Eastern periphery. The outsiders of the present
enlargement process Bolgaria and Romania are to join the EU in 2007. The rest of the Balkan
countries will be granted the possibility to join the European Union within the Stabilization and
Association process initiated in 1999. Croatia being the most successful of them can become the
EU member-state until 2010. If not take into consideration the vague future prospects of Turkey,
the final EU territorial configuration will depend on the probable membership of seven European
CIS states (Moldavia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Russian Federation, Georgia, Arminia and
Azerbaijan), which meet the basic geographical criterion.
Where is the final point of the European Union’s enlargement to the East? Is it possible to
determine this boundary? Wishing to find the answers to these questions in 1992 the European
Commission came to the conclusion that the “term “European” embraced geohistorical and
cultural components which both facilitate the determination of the European identity. Common
experience of bordering on each other, sharing ideas, values and historically based cooperation is
not reduced to a simple formulation, thus, it can be re-evaluated by other generations... This is the
reason why it is neither possible nor advisable to determine the boundaries of the European
Union which will find themselves in the course of time”
2
. Showing no desire to take the final
decision the European Commission put forward the Wider Europe strategy in March 2003. This
policy covers new Eastern neighbour states of the enlarged Union (Belarus, Moldavia and
Ukraine), the Russian Federation as well as the South Mediterranian countries. Brussels finds it
workable to turn the existing “instability curve” on the EU Southern and Eastern borders into a
“ring of friends” through gradual applying the tools of close association with every neighbour
state in accordance with its meeting the determined criteria of rapprochement. Thus, the
delimitation between the Wider Union and Wider Europe will coincide with the borderline of the
transient Commonwealth of Independent States turning Ukraine, Moldavia and Belarus into
common “close neighbourhood” of Russia and the European Union.
The author of this article suggests viewing the nowadays advancement of the European West to
the East of the continent through the prism of the gradual shift of its civilizational (geohistorical),
geopolitical, geoeconomic, institutional and political frontiers. We believe that the process of
“coming back to Europe” for the former hostages of the “socialist camp” includes four
fundamental components: basic stabilization and europeanisation, economic association and,
eventually, institutional accession to the EU. The European Union enlargement itself goes
through a number of particular stages conditioned by the procedural rules in force, the degree of
readiness of the applicant states along with the requirements for the “deepening” of the
integration process and the accommodation of interests of the Member States.
Volodymyr Poselskyy
Eurojournal.org, July 2004
_____________________________________________________________________________________
3
This paper is structured as follows. The first section reminds the geohistorical divisions of
Europe. The second one analyzes the bases and stages of the current unification of the Continent.
The third examines the ongoing sucessful integration of Central European countries to the
European Community and the following surge of the EU enlargment to the Balkans (creation of
One Europe). The fourth examines a new proximity policy of the EU towards its neighbours
(creation of the Wider Europe). Finally, we will make an attempt to model the progressive
integration into the EU of Ukraine as the biggest and the most important element of the zone of
geopolitical uncertainty which still exists between the EU and Russia.
Geohistorical divisions of the Old Continent
Our history is the most substantial element of self-determination within the system of national,
religious and civilizational coordinates. The thesis on historical affiliation with Europe has
become an inalienable feature of the EU orientation of the East European postcommunist leaders
(from Croatia to Ukraine)
3
. At the same time, a number of West European politicians repudiated
the requests of Turkey or East European CIS states to join the EU, the repudiation being based,
along with other factors, on the conviction that these countries do not historically belong to the
European civilization as they are parts of Islamic world (Turkey) or the Russian area (Ukraine,
Moldavia and Transcaucasian countries)
4
.
From the point of view of geohistorical development
5
Europe is usually specified as a certain
civilizational unity and is often identified with West European or simply Western (Euroatlantic)
civilization. Civilizational boundaries of Europe are determined differently depending on the
criteria, epoch or the national identity of the author. Numerous West European investigators of
the “cold war” period considered fixed borders of the Western bloc as a historically grounded
boundary for the European civilization. That was the boundary shaping the Carolingian Empire in
the East in 800 A.D. and, later, limiting the area of integral formation of liberal ideology, national
states, democracies and capitalism (Delmas, 1980, Мendras, 1997). Meanwhile, Central
European scholars emphasised indissoluble cultural and spiritual unity Mitteleuropa (as the
bearer of Catholicism and the former constituent, element of the Austria Hungarian Empire) with
the European West (Kundera, 1983). Such an emphasis on cultural and religious commonness
makes the ecclesiastical schism of 1054 shape the Eastern border of European civilization. That
schism separated Catholic Europe from orthodox Bizantium and Kyiv Rus and then turned into
the front line with the Golden Horde and the Ottoman Empire. According to another prevailing
point of view the Eastern boundary of Europe goes along the Western border of the Russain
geopolitical area which is considered a separate civilization (Halecki, 1952, Douguine, 2002).
On the whole there is a need to specify two probable approaches to the geohistorical
configuration of the European continent. One group of researches draws Europe as a single
European civilization which consists of the West European core and several layers of belonging
to Europe as far as the East. In particular, French geographer Jacques Lévy distinguishes three
gradual expansions of the European West to its Eastern periphery (Lévy, 1997). The first
absorbed the Central European territories which were not destroyed by the Mongols and were
under the rule of the Ottoman or Russian Empires for only a short time. The second expansion
covered the Balkans and the East of the continent which had long been under the rule of Turkey
or Russia. In its third expansion the European dominant extends to the centres of the Ottoman and
Russian Empires and the territories which had long been under the Mongols’ rule, with the
Volodymyr Poselskyy
Eurojournal.org, July 2004
_____________________________________________________________________________________
4
boudary between the first and the second zones overlapping the schism between the Cathilics and
Orthodox believers.
At the same time other researches separate several civilizations. In his fundumental volume
“Grammaire de civilisations” Fernand Braudel distinguishes three such civilizations: “Europe”
(Western and Central Europe); “America” (Latin America, the United States, Canada, Australia,
New Zeland) та “the Other Europe” (the Russian Empire – the USSR) (Braudel, 1963).
According to Hungarian historian Jeno Szücs the European goehistorical space is composed of
“three Europes” – Western, Cenral-Eastern and Eastern (the Russian space) (Szücs, 1985). Greek
researcher Dimitri Kitsikis suggests splitting the whole Euroasian continent onto three great
civilizational zones: 1) the West or Western Europe embracing some territories in the East, which
belonged to the Austrian-Hungarian and German Empires; 2) the East covering India, South-
Eastern Asia and China; 3) the intermediate region including the territories, which used to be
parts of the Byzantium and Ottoman Empires as well as the territories under Russian rule
(Kitsikis, 1985).
If, advocating F. Braudel’s ideas, we determine a civilization as a geohistorical space, which is
characterized by the whole range of sustainable social, political and economic features together
with a certain collective mentality
6
, then it seems the most appropriate to separate geohistorical
Europe into four civilizational zones: two “integral” civilizations, which can be arbitrary called
the European West and the Euroasian East, a “split” civilization of the Southern East or the
“Orient of Europe” (Prévélakis in Barnavi, Goossens, 2001) and, finally, the particular
civilizational area of Central Europe.
Indeed, geohistorical Europe emerged on the grounds of three great territorial formations. First of
all, “Europa Occidens” (Carolingian and Roman Western Europe) protected from nomads’ forays
since the Xth century, did “discover” Europe with its humanistic and rational attitude towards the
world. The variety of centres of power and initiative (external balance of European powers,
separation of clerical and secular authorities, autonomous rule in cities and gradual formation of
civil society) launched a historical and cultural ”whirlwind” of the West European civilization
(Morin, 1987). Avoiding a deep analysis of distinctive features of the European West (which was
the subject of research for several generations of the Europeans) it is worth paying attention to
the internal structure of this civilizational space, namely: the existence of a dynamic West
European core, which enjoyed the advantages of the four stage formula (consolidation of national
states, liberal ideology, capitalism and democracy) and favourable geographical position
(Cosandey, 1997); its Northern (Denmark, Scandinavian countries, Iceland) and Southern (Spain,
Portugal, Southern Italy) peripheries. While Northern periphery countries (Great Britain included
in this respect) differed from the West European core states only in less distinctive European self-
identification, Southern periphery countries demonstrated more and more noticeable lagging
behind in their social, economic, political and ideological modernization. Considering all this,
The South of Europe is approximating the Central European region geohistorical development.
Civilizational closeness of the Central European countries to the West European geohistorical
space results from numerous factors: their involvement into cultural and spiritual achievements of
the European West (spreading of Catholicism, considerable impact of Renaissance, Reformation
and Enlightenment epochs); the initial similarity of political, social and economic structures (the
formation of sovereign states, the existence of feudal vassality institutions, the Magdeburg Law,
Volodymyr Poselskyy
Eurojournal.org, July 2004
_____________________________________________________________________________________
5
the culture of legal and contract relations); the long-lasting subordination in Austria Hungarian
and German Empires. However, starting with the ХVI century, the Central European region
selected a civilizational pattern different from the Western Europe. The pattern revealed itself in
prolonged loss of statehood (under the combined pressure of Austria and Hungarian, German,
Ottoman and Russian Empires), in significant delay in carrying out agrarian and industrial
revolutions (due to introducing a second serfdom in ХVI century, in particular), in confined
democratic reforms (excluding Czechia in respect of the last two factors). According to French
researcher Jacques Rupnik, Central Europe belonged to the European West referring to culture
and civilizational self-identification, from the point of view of its social and economic
development the region shared most of the features of the retrograde and state-controlled model
of the Euroasian East. In political dimension the Central European “semiauthoritaritarism” took
an intermediate position between Russian despotism and Western democracy (Rupnik, 1993).
Another great geohistoric space covered the Balkan penincular and Anatolia, which joined
Byzantium and Ottoman Empires in succession
7
. In this respect it is more appropriate to
determine a “split” and mixed civilization of the “Orient of Europe” as a specific civilizational
crossroads for the West and East, founded on the cooperation and competition of Greek, Turkish,
South Slavonic, Russian and Austrian elements, the fight between Orthodox believers,
Catholicism and Islam. The Balkan region (excluding Greece) was characterised by a more
significant, in comparison with Central Europe, lagging behind in national, state, democratic,
social and economic development intensified by the complicated ethnic interfusion of the
population and the established periphery position. World Wars I and II resulted in the split of the
“Orient of Europe” into three separate parts: secular Turkish Republic (an important element of
the post-war Western bloc); Greece, which joined the EEC in 1981; the West Balkan countries,
which experienced various patterns of post-war socialist construction.
In the long run, the Mongol invasion in the middle of the ХІІІ century interrupted the
development of the original form of the European identity in the North-Eastern part of the
Christendom, i.e. in Kyiv Rus. Instead of shaping a civilization of the European East, the region
produced a new attempt – the Moscow Princedom, which framed a particular civilizational space
that could be called a Euroasian East. As was the case with the area under Ottoman rule, the
Russain Empire spread beyond the geographical borders of Europe reaching the Pacific Ocean
front in the East and the Pamirs mountains in the South. On the whole the European civilization
acquired the shape of a pure centralised imperial space consisting of the nucleus and four
periphery zones: the neighbouring Western periphery (the Baltic countries, Eastern and Central
Ukraine and Belarus) with the extention to Finland and Central Europe (the distant Western
periphery); the Southern periphery (the Transcaucasia, Central Asia); the North-Eastern periphery
(Siberia, the Far East). Due to its internal civilizational evolution first autocratic and later Soviet
Russia counterbalanced the European West relying on the tight authoritative model of
development and the subordination of all spheres of social life to the state rule
8
.
The proposed concept of “four Europes” shifts the point from seeking the answer to the
“insoluble”
9
question “Where does Europe end?” to considering protracted internal schisms of
the European geohistorical space. The concept also explains the existence of stable periphery
zones in the middle of the continent. The matter is that the delimitation lines between the
abovementioned civilizational areas did not reduce to borderlines or boundaries but were not
fixed and in the course of time turned into borderlands or frontiers. Jacques Lévy remarks in this
Volodymyr Poselskyy
Eurojournal.org, July 2004
_____________________________________________________________________________________
6
respect that the European space includes some “weak points which seem to be doomed to a
position of a minority or a victim as well as the respective societies seem unfit for the role of
masters of their own fate” (Lévy, 1997). Given three basic characteristics of the boundary-
territories (lack of statehood tradition, the status of the “buffer” between various goehistorical
spaces and, in consequence, indetermined or inconsistent civilizational self-identification of
populations) one can identify two “model” internal peripheries of geohistorical Europe, namely:
contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina in the South and Ukraine together with Belarus in the
East
10 15
. From the Roman Empire’s split into Western and Eastern parts till collapses of Austria
and Hungary and Ottoman Empires Bosnia was deemed backward and weak periphery which
manifested itself in religious schism deviding the population into Orthodox believers, Catholics
and Muslims as well as in hopeless incapability to build up its own state structure. In its own turn
the historical evolution of the South-Western part of the Kyiv state following the Mongol
invasion brought about the separation of three different geohistorical regions: Western Ukraine as
the steady Eastern periphery of Central Europe (above all Greek-Catholic Halychyna, which fell
under Russian rule only in 1939); the Central region comprising ethnic Ukrainian lands on the
right and left banks of the Dnipro River and subsequently belonging to Rzech Pospolita and
Russia; Southern and Eastern Ukraine (steady South-Western periphery of the Euroasian space)
which have become ethnically mingled since settling in ХVII – XVIII centuries and then
russianized with time.
Seeing the dimensions and the further geopolitical uncertainty of the young Ukrainian state, the
Ukrainian issue requires particular attention. At the moment Ukrainian political stage is occupied
by the advocates of profound democratic reforms and Ukraine’s consistent advance towards
united Europe (“Our Ukraine/ Nasha Ukraina”, Julia Tymoshenko’s Bloc and the Socialist party)
as well as representatives of the present authoritative oligarchical regime and communists who
see the future of Ukraine in close union with Russia in either a renovated Euroasian or the former
Soviet form. Such a division on “pro-West” and “pro-Euroasian” proponents reflects the
customary geohistorical differentiation of Ukrainian population. Thus, the latest parliamentary
election in spring 2002 witnessed the large-scale victory of Viktor Yushchenko’s right centrist
bloc “Nasha Ukraina” in Halytchyna and its overall victory in all other regions of Western,
Central and Northern Ukraine (excluding the Poltava region, where Olexander Moroz’ Socialist
party outpaced “Nasha Ukraina”), whereas communists and “statepower party” representatives
prevailed in the South and East of Ukraine
11 16
.
This brief goehistorical review alows regarding the postwar European construction as the initial
uniting process in the European West in consequence of the West European nucleus expansion on
its Northern (1973, 1995) and Southern peripheries (1986). Following the accession of Greece,
which, frankly speaking, was treated more like a country of the North Mediterrainian region and
the successor of ancient Hellas, the European West entered the split space of the “Orient of
Europe” (1981). Absorbing Eastern Germany (1990) and merging Austria (1995) foreboded the
present enlargement onto the Central European states. Given the predictable accession of
Romania and Bolgaria the rest of the Balkan states automatically turn into the inner South
Eastern periphery of the European Communty. Thus, the project of “One Europe” is gradually
eliminating the goehistorical schisms in the minds of the Europeans, separated the European
West from Central Europe, Bysantium and Ottoman Southern East. At the same time European
modern mental geography preserves the civilizational boundary with Turkey and the
Volodymyr Poselskyy
Eurojournal.org, July 2004
_____________________________________________________________________________________
7
Commonwealth of Independent States, which is considered to be the successor of the Euroasian
East not without good reason.
Seeing Russian positioning as an equal partner rather than a potential member of the European
Union as well as Russian aspiration for preserving its geopolitical and civilizational zone of
influence the debate on political delimitation of the One Europe is being reduced to the issue of
borders between the enlarged European Union and the “expanded” Russian space without
considering the problem of Turkey. If the geopolitical route for Moldova and Belarus appear to
be practically determined (further EU integration for the former and close union with Russia for
the latter), while the future for the Transcaucasian states is beyond foreseeing, the Ukrainian
issue might require close attention in the coming decade.
Stages and bases of the current unification process on the continent
Contemporary move to unite Europe within a single political and economic community is often
regarded as the latest geopolitical “expansion of the West” or, vice versa, a civilizational
“European homecoming”. We believe that it is worthwhile defining the current advancement of
the European Union to the East of the continent as the process of voluntarily assuming all the
Western norms and values by the countries of the former Eastern Europe, which facilitates their
economic integration as well as further accession to the European Community. Regarding all this
approaching the EU contains four interconnected stages: stabilization, basic europeanisation, the
establishment of association and the acquiring of membership.
1. Stabilization
Internal territorial integrity and friendly relations with country neighbours form the reliable basis
for democratic and market transformations in each post-communist state. However, the
stabilization is not reduced to eliminating military conflict threat or hedging particular regions
(“hard” threats). It presupposes efficient state management which provides for effective
combatting organized crime and corruption inside the country, reliable border controlling and
preventing illigal emigration of its citizens to other countries (“weak” threats). Therefore,
reaching full stability requires the formation of not only a “strong” but also a lawful and wealthy
state with transparent governing, respecting fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens,
namely, the rights of national minorities, overcoming social and economic backwardness and
poverty of the population. The upsurge of national conflicts in Yugoslavia and the USSR, the
considerable number of national minorities in Central European countries, overall threat of
“weak” risks assigned the stabilization with the prominent role in Western Europe. In practice,
the EU initiated concluding the Stability Pact for Central Eastern (1995) and South Eastern
Europe (1999). Nowadays basic stabilization tasks are pressing for solution in the Transcaucasian
states (undetermined status for Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh and Southern Osetia), in the
Russian Federation (the war in Chechnya), in Serbia and Montenegro (the future for Kosovo and
Montenegro), in Moldova (the problem of the Transdniestr region), whereas Bosnia and
Hertzogovina have succeeded in stabilization under the protectorate of the international
community. Although almost all the countries of the Western Balkans pose considerable weak
threats.
Volodymyr Poselskyy
Eurojournal.org, July 2004
_____________________________________________________________________________________
8
2.Basic europeanisation
Basic europeanisation means the general process of political, economic and social transformation
which promoted the transition of the former socialist states to sustainable democracy, lawful state
and market economy
12
. In this respect basic europeanisation includes three elements: 1)
fundamental reform of various parts of a national legislation meeting the commitments made to
the European Council, the WTO and the EU (change of legal scope); 2) practical implementation
of new rules of play in political and business activity (change in conduct of local political and
economic agents); 3) European selfidentification by the elit and the majority of population, which
reveals itself in the orientation not only to the civilizational but also to the contemporary political
and economic model of European development (change of collective awareness). In other words,
basic europeanisation is the process of shifting geopolitical boundaries of the European political
area
13
. According to the report “Nations in Transit 2003” produced by American non-
governmental organization “Freedom House”, all Central and South East European states (except
Bosnia and Hertzogovina) have already reached the level of consolidated or partially
consolidated democracy, while the CIS European countries remain transitional or autocratic
regimes (see Table 1)
14
. From its own part, the EU introduced regional financial aid programmes
(PHARE, TACIS, CARDS), which aim at promoting faster stabilization and europeanisation of
post-communist states.
Table 1. Steps of basic europeanisation
Consolid
ated
democra-
cies
DEM RO
L
Democracie
s
(some
consolida-
tion)
DE
M
RO
L
Transition-
al (hybrid)
regimes
DE
M
RO
L
Autocraс
ie
s
DE
M
RO
L
Poland
1,63
2,0
0
Bolgaria
3,13 3,88 Bosnia
4,31 5,00 Azerbaijan
5,31 5,75
Slovenia
1,75
1,8
8
Romania
3,25 4,38 Moldova
4,38 5,38 Belarus
6,63 6,13
Hungary
1,81
2,2
5
Croatia
3,44 4,50 Ukraine
4,50 5,13
Slovakia
1,81
2,6
3
Serbia
and
Montenegro
3,50 4,63 Armenia
4,69 5,38
Luthuania 1,88
2,6
3
Albania
3,94 4,63 Georgia
4,69 5,13
Estonia
1.94
2,1
3
Macedonia
3,94 5,00 Russia
4,88 5,13
Latvia
1,94
2,8
8
Czech
republic
2,00
3,0
0
3. Establishment of association
Volodymyr Poselskyy
Eurojournal.org, July 2004
_____________________________________________________________________________________
9
The institution of association based on article 310 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community (TEC) is often identified with the EU associate membership status. Actually it
embraces various forms of associated partnership which are carried out through specially
established bodies (Councils, committees associations/partnerships) and mainly deal with
promoting various forms of economic integration: joining the Single Market, setting up the
Customs Union or a free trade zone with the EU (see Table 2). Given all this, Partnership and
Cooperation agreements (PCA) with the CIS states should be considered the lowest level of
association, which points out only the possibility to set up a free trade zone with the Russian
Federation, Moldova and Ukraine in future (depending on the realization of economic reforms in
these countries). On the whole the Association agreements concluded by the EU can be fairly
related to the shift of its geoeconomic borders.
Close connection of associated partnership with the EU accession procedure seems none the less
misleading. It is out of doubt that joining the EU goes through preliminary economic
liberalization, which, in its turn, requires an EU country-partner to assimilate numerous elements
of acquis communautaire, whose task is to provide equal and fair competition (harmonization of
antitrust legislation, corporate law, state subsidy regimes, rules for protecting copyright and
consumers’ rights, etc.). Associated partnership undoubtedly facilitates economic modernization
of the associated countries and their approaching the European Union. At the same time the very
fact of concluding Association agreements has limited impact on initiating the EU institutional
accession procedure under which it is much more important for the EU to formally admit the
“applicant” status of a country as well as for the country to apply
15
. In other words, the realization
of associated partnership differs from the accession procedure, though they are interconnected
processes which can take place simultaneously much the way it happened with the Baltik states
or Slovenia. Sometimes Association agreements serve rather as a means of putting off the
probable membership (first “European” agreements with Poland and Hungary, establishing the
Customs Union with Turkey), as an alternative to the membership itself (the EEA agreement,
probable Neighbourhood agreements with the CIS states), or even as a form of privileged
relations with the former colonies of the Southern Mediterrainian, Tropical Africa or Latin
America regions. On the whole, as is the case with geopolitical Europe, the Eastern geoeconomic
boundary of the European Community coincides with the Western border of the CIS.
Table 2. Steps of economic integration of the European periphery
Level of
economic
integration
State-
participants
(beyond
The EU-25
)
Date of
signing
the
ssociatio
n
agreemen
t
Date of
applicatio
n
Characteristic features and commentaries
New
member-
states
(since
1.05.2004)
Malta
Cyprus
Poland
Hungary
Czech rep.
Slovakia
05.12.19
70
19.12.19
72
16.12.19
91
16.07.19
90
03.07.19
90
05.04.19
94
Cyprus,
Malta:
concluding
Association
agreements, which envisage a probable two-
stage establishment of the Customs Union (in
both cases pending the negotiations on
accession, with the Customs Union on
manufactured goods being not realized)
CCEE: concluding “European agreements”,
Volodymyr Poselskyy
Eurojournal.org, July 2004
_____________________________________________________________________________________
10
Estonia
Lithuania
Latvia
Slovenia
16.12.19
91
06.10.19
93
06.10.19
93
12.06.19
95
12.06.19
95
12.06.19
95
10.06.19
96
31.03.19
94
17.01.19
96
27.06.19
95
24.11.19
95
08.12.19
95
03.10.19
9510.06.
1996
which stipulate an asymmetrical transition to
free manufactured goods trade zones, partial
liberalization of three other freedoms
Other spheres: political dialogue, introduction of
a visa-free regime
European
Economic
Area
Norway
Iceland
Liechtenste
in
02.05.19
92
Access to the EU common market through free
movement of manufactured goods, people,
services and capitals (without expansion to
agriculture and Customs regime of the third
world countries).
Other spheres: joining the EU foreign policy
declarations, Norway and Iceland’s joining the
Shengen area
Customs
Union
Turkey
12.09.19
63
14.04.19
87
Customs Union introduction since 1.01.1996
regarding manufactured goods
Other spheres: political dialogue, maintaining
the visa regime
Free trade
zone
Switzerlan
d
Romania
Bolgaria
22.07.19
72
08.02.19