ÿþ <html> <head><title>Paper by A.Gosseries quoting La faillite coupable des retraites</title></head> <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF"> <table width=100%> <tr><td> <div align="left"> <b><a href=../dcfr/dc515gosseriesmar05fr.htm>French</a></b> </div> <p> </td><td> <div align="right"> <b><a href=../index.htm>Home</a></b> </div> <p> </td></tr> <p> <tr><td width=60% bgcolor=#EEEEFF> <div align=left> A paper by <b><a href=http://www.uclouvain.be/11692.html>Axel Gosseries</a></b> on inter-generational justice, quoting <i>La faillite coupables des retraites</i>. (see p.3, yellow marks), published in <i>Gaia - Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society</i>, 14(1), p.40-46. <br> <br> After the internet version, <nobr>Mar 05</nobr>. <nobr><b><a href="http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/Pers_Axel/Publications_pdf/ On_the_Unfairness_of_Brun(fin).pdf">Source 1</a></b></nobr>, <nobr><b><a href="http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/etes/documents/Brun.pdf">Source 2</a></b></nobr> </div> </td><td valign=top nowrap> <div align="right"> <b><a href=dc100.htm#fcr>The Secret of the West</a></b> <br> <b><a href=dc001.htm>Cosandey</a></b> </div> </td></tr> </table> <p> <hr> <a name=start></a> <hr> <html> <head> <style type="text/css"> <!-- .goohl0{color:black;background-color:#ffff66} .goohl1{color:black;background-color:#A0FFFF} .goohl2{color:black;background-color:#99ff99} --> </style> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"> <meta name="Producer" content="Acrobat Distiller 5.0.5 (Windows)"> <meta name="Author" content="etes"> <meta name="Creator" content="Acrobat PDFMaker 5.0 pour Word"> <meta name="ModDate" content="D:20050121115724+01'00'"> <meta name="CreationDate" content="D:20050121115711+01'00'"> <title>Introduction Sustainable development has become a key concept in public </title> </head><body bgcolor=#ffffff vlink="blue" link="blue"> <table border=0 width=100%><tr><td bgcolor=eeeeee align=right><font face=arial,sans-serif><a name=1><b>Page 1</b></a></font></td></tr></table><font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:300;left:106"><nobr><b>Lead Paragraph</b>: Sustainability is not only a matter of justice. Still, any </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:319;left:106"><nobr>plausible theory of sustainable development needs to be explicit about the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:337;left:106"><nobr>philosophical views it necessarily embodies on intergenerational justice.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:356;left:106"><nobr>This requires some detailed work on the philosophical side, with</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:374;left:106"><nobr>potentially unexpected outcomes. One of them is that it may be unjust to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:393;left:106"><nobr>transfer <i>more </i>to the next generation than what we inherited from the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:412;left:106"><nobr>previous one. And another one is that Brundtland s often cited view on the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:430;left:106"><nobr>matter may not be as obviously just as it seems. </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:302;left:658"><nobr><b>Introduction </b></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:343;left:658"><nobr>Sustainable development has become a key concept in public </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:363;left:658"><nobr>discourse. No doubt the idea of intergenerational justice constitutes </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:384;left:658"><nobr>one of its central components. Still, there are only very few attempts </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:404;left:658"><nobr>within the sustainability literature to examine precisely what </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:425;left:658"><nobr>intergenerational justice could mean, given the level of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:445;left:658"><nobr>sophistication available in the field of philosophical theories of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:466;left:658"><nobr>justice. This paper aims to provide a critical overview of the various</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:486;left:658"><nobr>philosophical theories of intergenerational justice, and to show that</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:507;left:658"><nobr>some of them may be more robust than others. Moreover, it aims at </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:527;left:658"><nobr>indicating the extent to which sustainable development, as defined </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:548;left:658"><nobr>in the Brundtland report &lt;1&gt; is unable to reject two major </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:568;left:658"><nobr>intergenerational injustices. </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:467;left:106"><nobr><b>Abstract</b>: At the heart of any concept of sustainable development lies an</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:486;left:106"><nobr>idea of intergenerational justice. The latter can be understood in various</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:504;left:106"><nobr>ways, depending on the general theory of justice one considers most </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:523;left:106"><nobr>defensible. The author spells out six possible philosophical views on the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:542;left:106"><nobr>matter. He shows the extent to which differences in logic also translate as</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:560;left:106"><nobr>significant differences in the intergenerational principles to be followed,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:579;left:106"><nobr>using notions of savings and dis-savings. Special attention is being paid to</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:598;left:106"><nobr>two reasons why the directives of a luck egalitarian theory of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:616;left:106"><nobr>intergenerational justice do not necessarily coincide with Brundtland s</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:635;left:106"><nobr>view on intergenerational justice. Such differences become clear once we </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:654;left:106"><nobr>understand that, as a matter of principle, luck egalitarians should oppose </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:672;left:106"><nobr>not only generational dis-savings, but also generational savings, hence </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:691;left:106"><nobr>stick to a strict  neither less, nor more rule. </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:609;left:658"><nobr>Among the assumptions at play here, let us underline two. On the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:630;left:658"><nobr>one hand, we will only look at the <i>size </i>of the basket of « goods » </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:650;left:658"><nobr>(broadly understood) to be transferred by each generation to the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:671;left:658"><nobr>next one. The <i>nature </i>of the goods to be included in this basket will </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:691;left:658"><nobr>not be discussed here. It is full of elements that constitute capital,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:712;left:658"><nobr>broadly understood, namely a physical component, but also</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:732;left:658"><nobr>technological, cultural, relational, political& element. Hence, we</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:753;left:658"><nobr>shall not address here the substitution issue (e.g. can we substitute </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:773;left:658"><nobr>oil consumption with new technologies, or biodiversity with </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:794;left:658"><nobr>musical discoveries ?). This is of course central to the weak v. strong </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:814;left:658"><nobr>sustainability debate. </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:727;left:106"><nobr><b>Keywords</b>: Intergenerational Justice, Brundtland, Rawls, Growth,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:746;left:106"><nobr>Sustainability, Luck egalitarianism, Sufficientarianism. </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:804;left:139"><nobr><b>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability </b></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:844;left:292"><nobr><b>Axel Gosseries </b></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:8px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:846;left:409"><nobr><b><a href="#1">*1</a></b></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:868;left:658"><nobr>1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:887;left:658"><nobr>E-mail : gosseries@etes.ucl.ac.be </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:7px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:888;left:106"><nobr>*</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:887;left:114"><nobr>Postal address :</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:906;left:106"><nobr>Chaire Hoover d éthique économique et sociale </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:7px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:907;left:658"><nobr>1</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:906;left:669"><nobr>The author wishes to thank A.-P. André-Dumont, P.-M. Boulanger, M.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:924;left:658"><nobr>Howard, D. Robichaud, I. Schumacher, C. Wolf and a referee from GAIA</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:943;left:658"><nobr>for comments on an earlier draft. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:924;left:106"><nobr>Université catholique de Louvain </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:943;left:106"><nobr>Place Montesquieu, 3 </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:996;left:760"><nobr>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability : 1 </nobr></div> </span></font> <div style="position:absolute;top:1067;left:0"><hr><table border=0 width=100%><tr><td bgcolor=eeeeee align=right><font face=arial,sans-serif><a name=2><b>Page 2</b></a></font></td></tr></table></div><font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:1194;left:106"><nobr>On the other hand, we shall assume that the global population size</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1215;left:106"><nobr>remains constant over time. The latter assumption is significant. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1235;left:106"><nobr>Due to their internal logic, some theories will arguably tend to be </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1256;left:106"><nobr>indifferent to population changes (e.g. this would follow from a </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1276;left:106"><nobr>standard version of the indirect reciprocity view presented below)</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1297;left:106"><nobr>whereas others will more naturally endorse a <i>per capita </i>proviso (e.g. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1317;left:106"><nobr>the egalitarian views set out below). Theories of the latter type may</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1338;left:106"><nobr>thus be especially demanding in a context of growing population.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1358;left:106"><nobr>Conversely, it is often overlooked that while population decline </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1379;left:106"><nobr>may be a problem from the point of view of financing pension and</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1399;left:106"><nobr>health care systems in aging populations, it also entails that, for</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1420;left:106"><nobr>such population-sensitive normative theories, a lesser global capital </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1441;left:106"><nobr>will have to be transferred to the next generation if the latter is less </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1461;left:106"><nobr>populated. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1215;left:658"><nobr>The first theory, formulated and discussed in a very explicit way by</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1235;left:658"><nobr>authors such as Barry &lt;2&gt; and Masson &lt;3&gt; is called indirect </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1256;left:658"><nobr>reciprocity. The basic idea behind such a view is that our moral </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1276;left:658"><nobr>obligations towards other people can only be envisaged within a </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1297;left:658"><nobr>reciprocity framework. This is for example the case for people who </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1317;left:658"><nobr>consider in the intragenerational context that only those who have</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1338;left:658"><nobr>contributed through their work in the past or who will contribute in</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1358;left:658"><nobr>the future should be granted unemployment benefits if needed. In</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1379;left:658"><nobr>the intergenerational context, one may suspect that this is actually a </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1399;left:658"><nobr>widespread view among the public.</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:8px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:1401;left:922"><nobr><a href="#2">2</a></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:1399;left:932"><nobr>Two maxims are involved, the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1420;left:658"><nobr>former providing us with an explanation as to <i>why </i>we would have </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1441;left:658"><nobr>any obligation towards the next generation, the latter <i>defining the</i></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1461;left:658"><nobr><i>content </i>of our intergenerational obligations: </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1502;left:106"><nobr>Moreover, for each of the theories we present, the reader will be</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1522;left:106"><nobr>provided with a short synoptic table involving the concepts of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1543;left:106"><nobr>savings and dis-savings. For present purposes, there is (positive) </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1563;left:106"><nobr>savings (hereinafter : SAV) whenever a generation is transferring to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1584;left:106"><nobr>the next one more capital (broadly understood) than the one it</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1604;left:106"><nobr>inherited itself from the previous generation. Conversely, there is </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1625;left:106"><nobr>dis-savings (hereinafter : DIS) whenever a generation transfers to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1646;left:106"><nobr>the next one less valuable a capital than the one it inherited itself </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1666;left:106"><nobr>from the previous generation. Moreover, there will be three </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1686;left:106"><nobr>modalities : prohibition (hereinafter : PROHIB), authorisation </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1707;left:106"><nobr>(hereinafter (AUTHO), obligation (hereinafter : OBLI). Hence, if a </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1728;left:106"><nobr>given theory allows each generation to transfer less to the next one </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1748;left:106"><nobr>than what it inherited from the previous one, we refer to it as  DIS</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1769;left:106"><nobr>AUTHO . If it is expected to transfer more, we signal it as  SAV </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1789;left:106"><nobr>OBLI . Let us now examine each of the theories in turn. </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:1502;left:701"><nobr><b>Maxim 1 </b>: The current generation owes something to the next one </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1520;left:701"><nobr>because it received something from the previous one. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1539;left:701"><nobr><b>Maxim 2 </b>: The current generation should transfer to the next one </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1558;left:701"><nobr>capital at least equivalent to the one it inherited itself from the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1576;left:701"><nobr>previous generation. </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:1616;left:658"><nobr>For all those associating justice with reciprocity, the concept of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1636;left:658"><nobr>indirect reciprocity is powerful since it allows us to justify </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1657;left:658"><nobr>obligations towards people who did not do anything for us so far, </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1677;left:658"><nobr>and who will perhaps end up having given <i>us </i>less than we will</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1698;left:658"><nobr>have given them. Whereas in the case of <i>direct </i>reciprocity, it is the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1718;left:658"><nobr>original benefactor who ends up recuperating the equivalent of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1739;left:658"><nobr>what he gave in the first place, in the case of <i>indirect </i>reciprocity as </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1759;left:658"><nobr>understood here, it is a third party (here : the next generation) who</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:7px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:1818;left:658"><nobr>2</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:1816;left:670"><nobr>For an empirical study providing indications of the popularity of the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1835;left:658"><nobr>« indirect reciprocity » view: &lt;4&gt; </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:1830;left:106"><nobr><b>Indirect Reciprocity </b></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:1830;left:398"><nobr>DIS PROHIB</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1830;left:506"><nobr>SAV AUTHO</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:1888;left:760"><nobr>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability : 2 </nobr></div> </span></font> <div style="position:absolute;top:1959;left:0"><hr><table border=0 width=100%><tr><td bgcolor=eeeeee align=right><font face=arial,sans-serif><a name=3><b>Page 3</b></a></font></td></tr></table></div><font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:2066;left:658"><nobr>Still, indirect reciprocity as defined above has to face three serious</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2086;left:658"><nobr>difficulties, the third one being the most general one. <i>First</i>, maxim 1</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2107;left:658"><nobr>presupposes the idea that we have obligations towards earlier</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2127;left:658"><nobr>generations, hence towards <i>dead </i>people as well. For it is they who </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2148;left:658"><nobr>are supposed to generate our obligations towards the next </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2168;left:658"><nobr>generation. Still, for a state to justify its sustainable development </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2189;left:658"><nobr>policies on the basis of obligations towards dead people seems </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2209;left:658"><nobr>rather incompatible with the requirement of a minimal neutrality</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2230;left:658"><nobr>towards the various conceptions of the good life as well as towards </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2250;left:658"><nobr>the variety of metaphysical views. Indeed, it can be shown that</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2271;left:658"><nobr>obligations towards the dead only make sense if we can claim that</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2291;left:658"><nobr>dead people do exist in a morally relevant sense. Such an</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2312;left:658"><nobr>assumption is probably far from shared by a majority among us.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2332;left:658"><nobr><i>Second</i>, Maxim 1 cannot be applied to a hypothetical <i>first </i>generation,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2353;left:658"><nobr>since the latter would not - by definition  have received anything </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2373;left:658"><nobr>from any generation preceding it. This theory is therefore unable to</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2394;left:658"><nobr>tell us what would be wrong in a first generation squandering a</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2414;left:658"><nobr>significant part of the capital it began with. <i>Third </i> and finally -, </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2435;left:658"><nobr>there is an even more serious difficulty. The very idea of reciprocity</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2455;left:658"><nobr>is problematic if one aims at using it as a basis for a full theory of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2476;left:658"><nobr>justice. For example, for all those who consider  in the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2496;left:658"><nobr>intragenerational context - that a person suffering from a major </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2517;left:658"><nobr>genetic disability should be granted at least decent social benefits, </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2538;left:658"><nobr>this could in principle only be done  for those willing to remain </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2558;left:658"><nobr>within a reciprocity framework  if we can reasonably expect this</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2578;left:658"><nobr>person to give us the equivalent in return in the future. Once we</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2599;left:658"><nobr>accept the reasonable assumption that most of us would want</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2620;left:658"><nobr>society - in the intragenerational context - to grant such a person</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2640;left:658"><nobr>with social benefits <i>irrespectively </i>of her ability to give something in </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2661;left:658"><nobr>return, we have to ask ourselves why this idea of reciprocity should </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2681;left:658"><nobr>remain at the heart of our theory of intergenerational justice. Hence, </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2701;left:658"><nobr>there are good reasons to look for other possible views. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2066;left:106"><nobr>replaces the original benefactor (here : the current generation). To </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2086;left:106"><nobr>take a family-based example, children (Generation 3) will be </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2107;left:106"><nobr>provided with generous funding for university studies at will by -</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2127;left:106"><nobr>or will inherit family photos from - their parents (Generation 2)  in</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2148;left:106"><nobr>return for the fact that their grandparents (Generation 1) did the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2168;left:106"><nobr>same for their own children (Generation 2). </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2209;left:106"><nobr>Notice that this standard view is only one out of three possible</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2230;left:106"><nobr>models of intergenerational reciprocity. Indeed, one alternative </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2250;left:106"><nobr>indirect reciprocity model goes in the opposite direction : the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2271;left:106"><nobr>current generation owes something to the previous one because of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2291;left:106"><nobr>what the previous one did for the one that preceded it. This is the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2312;left:106"><nobr>case with  pay-as-you-go pension schemes. Generation 2 (those</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2333;left:106"><nobr>who are currently active) owes retirement benefits to the members</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2353;left:106"><nobr>of Generation 1 (those who are now retiring) on the understanding </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2373;left:106"><nobr>that Generation 3 (those who did not enter the labour market yet)</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2394;left:106"><nobr>will do the same for Generation 2 in the future. And there is as well </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2414;left:106"><nobr>the theoretical if not practical possibility of a model of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2435;left:106"><nobr>intergenerational justice built strictly on <i>direct </i>reciprocity grounds.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2455;left:106"><nobr>This can be illustrated by <B><span class="goohl0">Cosandey</span></B> s « double reciprocity » view </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2476;left:106"><nobr>&lt;5&gt; according to which we owe something to the previous </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2496;left:106"><nobr>generation in return for what they <i>have </i>given us and we owe </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2517;left:106"><nobr>something to the next one in return for what they <i>will </i>give us. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2558;left:106"><nobr>The standard indirect reciprocity view is a rather robust theory that </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2578;left:106"><nobr>is immune to various possible objections. For example, we can</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2599;left:106"><nobr>answer the query of those asking why a mere gift could ever give</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2620;left:106"><nobr>rise to an obligation to give in return. For this objection can be </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2640;left:106"><nobr>rejected by underlining the fact that such a generation should be </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2661;left:106"><nobr>regarded as a free rider generation. It takes advantage of the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2681;left:106"><nobr>intergenerational train without paying its ticket, hence benefiting </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2702;left:106"><nobr>without reciprocity from the sacrifices made by earlier generations. </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:2780;left:760"><nobr>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability : 3 </nobr></div> </span></font> <div style="position:absolute;top:2851;left:0"><hr><table border=0 width=100%><tr><td bgcolor=eeeeee align=right><font face=arial,sans-serif><a name=4><b>Page 4</b></a></font></td></tr></table></div><font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3009;left:106"><nobr>One alternative to indirect reciprocity rests on the notion of a</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3030;left:106"><nobr>collective intergenerational property. The Earth  understood in </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3050;left:106"><nobr>very broad terms as containing both our natural and cultural</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3071;left:106"><nobr>heritage - belongs here to all the generations, and most significantly </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3091;left:106"><nobr>to the current and future ones. There are various ways of defending</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3112;left:106"><nobr>this view. Either we just state it as an assumption. Or, we refer to it </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3133;left:106"><nobr>as the will of God, as John Locke did.</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:8px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3134;left:394"><nobr><a href="#4">3</a></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3133;left:405"><nobr>A more interesting way of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3153;left:106"><nobr>justifying intergenerational collective property relies on more </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3173;left:106"><nobr>empirical assumptions and is suggested by Bourgeois &lt;7&gt;. Imagine </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3194;left:106"><nobr>first that the first generation was fully entitled to waste whatever it </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3215;left:106"><nobr>wanted from its initial endowment. Still, let us assume as well that </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3235;left:106"><nobr>at least <i>some </i>of the past generations bequeathed what they had</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3256;left:106"><nobr>inherited <i>not only </i>to the benefit of the very next generation, but also </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3276;left:106"><nobr>for the benefit of all coming generations. This is a plausible </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3297;left:106"><nobr>assumption from a historical point of view, especially given the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3317;left:106"><nobr>large number of generations that followed each other. We can then </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3338;left:106"><nobr>envisage the following scenario. While having been initially the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3358;left:106"><nobr>exclusive property of the first generation(s), as generations started</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3379;left:106"><nobr>appearing that wanted the whole set of coming generations to be </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3399;left:106"><nobr>regarded as the owners of the Earth, the Earth progressively</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3420;left:106"><nobr>acquired the status of an intergenerationally collective property,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3440;left:106"><nobr>because of the will of (a few of) the past generations. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3481;left:106"><nobr>Hence, the idea of an intergenerational collective property of what</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3502;left:106"><nobr>we inherited from the previous generation has various possible </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3522;left:106"><nobr>roots. It exhibits however a twofold characteristic worth some</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3543;left:106"><nobr>emphasis. On the one hand, the operational principle derived from</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3563;left:106"><nobr>this view is <i>identical </i>to the one embodied in an indirect reciprocity </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2958;left:658"><nobr>view (prohibition on dis-savings). On the other hand, the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2978;left:658"><nobr>underlying logic is clearly <i>distinct</i>. For, under an indirect reciprocity</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2999;left:658"><nobr>logic, the reason why we owe something to the next generation is </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3019;left:658"><nobr>because we <i>received </i>something from the previous one. In contrast,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3040;left:658"><nobr>under the collective property model, the reason why we owe our </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3060;left:658"><nobr>children something is simply because what we have is as much </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3081;left:658"><nobr>theirs as ours. There is a shift from giving « back » what is ours to</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3101;left:658"><nobr>giving back what is not (only) ours. Notice however that in the case</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3122;left:658"><nobr>of a justification « à la Bourgeois », a reference to the past  hence to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3142;left:658"><nobr>dead people - is not totally absent. For it is only if one respects the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3163;left:658"><nobr>will of the past generations that had a collectivistic view (i.e. that </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3183;left:658"><nobr>bequeathed the Earth to <i>all </i>coming generations, as opposed to the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3204;left:658"><nobr>one just following them), that one may then justify the collective</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3225;left:658"><nobr>property idea. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2957;left:106"><nobr><b>Collective property </b></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:2958;left:396"><nobr>DIS PROHIB</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:2958;left:503"><nobr>SAV AUTHO</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3265;left:658"><nobr>All this connects moreover with the famous North American Indian</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3286;left:658"><nobr>say : « Treat the Earth well : it was not given to you by your parents,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3306;left:658"><nobr>it was loaned to you by your children. We do not inherit the Earth </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3327;left:658"><nobr>from our Ancestors, we borrow it from our children ».<a href="#4"></a></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:8px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3329;left:1109"><nobr><a href="#4">4</a></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3327;left:1125"><nobr>This</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3347;left:658"><nobr>formulation is not totally unambiguous however, for if it were to be</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3368;left:658"><nobr>interpreted as meaning that no <i>current </i>generation could ever <i>own</i></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3388;left:658"><nobr>the Earth, then it would in a sense always remain no generation s</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3409;left:658"><nobr>property (<i>res nullius</i>). It would always be lent to all generations,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3430;left:658"><nobr>whichever it is. In contrast, if it were to be interpreted as a </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3450;left:658"><nobr>translation of the idea of collective property, then we would not see</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3470;left:658"><nobr>why the lending and borrowing language should be relied upon,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3491;left:658"><nobr>since it does not make sense for a current generation to borrow </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3512;left:658"><nobr>what is already its own (at least in part). </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:7px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3620;left:106"><nobr>3</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3619;left:115"><nobr>See &lt;6&gt;, at §8 </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:7px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3620;left:658"><nobr>4</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3619;left:667"><nobr>Various internet sources </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3672;left:760"><nobr>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability : 4 </nobr></div> </span></font> <div style="position:absolute;top:3743;left:0"><hr><table border=0 width=100%><tr><td bgcolor=eeeeee align=right><font face=arial,sans-serif><a name=5><b>Page 5</b></a></font></td></tr></table></div><font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3901;left:106"><nobr>Let us now explore another theory : utilitarianism. It is </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3922;left:106"><nobr>characterised by its preoccupation with people s welfare (<i>utilitas </i>in</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3942;left:106"><nobr>Latin). More importantly, it also claims that the fairest way of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3963;left:106"><nobr>organising society is the one that maximises the <i>aggregate </i>welfare of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3983;left:106"><nobr>its members. This is the reason why we refer to it as an aggregative</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4004;left:106"><nobr>theory. There are several unsound reasons to criticise utilitarianism. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4025;left:106"><nobr>What is true however, is that it is not primarily concerned with the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4045;left:106"><nobr><i>distribution </i>of welfare across members of society. What matters for </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4065;left:106"><nobr>utilitarians is the aggregate size of the welfare pie from which </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4086;left:106"><nobr>society as a whole will benefit, not the relative size of the pieces </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4107;left:106"><nobr>each member will end up with. Therefore, it may well advocate </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4127;left:106"><nobr>sacrificing the well-being of a few people (entailing e.g. slavery for </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4148;left:106"><nobr>each of them) whenever this would be necessary for society as a </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4168;left:106"><nobr>whole to maximize its aggregate welfare (here : each member of a </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4189;left:106"><nobr>large majority deriving a small amount of extra welfare from the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4209;left:106"><nobr>slavery condition of a tiny minority). Hence utilitarianism  because</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4230;left:106"><nobr>of its aggregativism  is more likely than other theories to lead to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4250;left:106"><nobr>sacrificial consequences. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4291;left:106"><nobr>In the intergenerational context, this is a crucial fact. Giving up the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4312;left:106"><nobr>consumption of part of our capital today may enable « us »  </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4332;left:106"><nobr>provided that this capital is invested properly  to consume much</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4353;left:106"><nobr>more capital in a more or less close future. Think about a bag of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4373;left:106"><nobr>seeds, part of which is being used to bake bread today and the rest </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4394;left:106"><nobr>being sown in order to increase the amount of seeds available </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4414;left:106"><nobr>during the following year. Hence, savings (in the sense of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4435;left:106"><nobr>transferring to the next generation more than what we inherited </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4455;left:106"><nobr>from the previous one) is not only authorised. It is even <i>required </i>by</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4476;left:106"><nobr>utilitarians, given that the goal is to maximise the size of the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4496;left:106"><nobr>intergenerational pie of welfare. This entails that the first </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3850;left:658"><nobr>generations in history will have to tighten up their belts in order to</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3870;left:658"><nobr>allow for investments that will only benefit the next generations. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3849;left:106"><nobr><b>Utilitarianism </b></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3850;left:397"><nobr>DIS PROHIB SAV OBLI </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:3911;left:658"><nobr>This is a worrying result once we consider an <i>indefinite </i>number of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3932;left:658"><nobr>generations. For one way of interpreting utilitarianism would then </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3952;left:658"><nobr>consist in asking each and every generation to sacrifice itself </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3973;left:658"><nobr>without ever knowing if any significant number of generations will </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:3993;left:658"><nobr>follow and be able to benefit from such sacrifice. A sacrifice to no </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4014;left:658"><nobr>one s benefit (given the permanent uncertainty as to how many</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4034;left:658"><nobr>generations will follow) is certainly a very problematic outcome. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4055;left:658"><nobr>Utilitarians are of course aware of this kind of result. They have</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4075;left:658"><nobr>proposed to introduce a <i>discounting factor </i>(e.g. about the importance </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4096;left:658"><nobr>to be given to the respective welfare units of each generation). </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4116;left:658"><nobr>However, such an <i>ad hoc </i>approach has not so far been developed in </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4137;left:658"><nobr>a convincing manner, able to avoid the symmetric problem of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4157;left:658"><nobr>systematically disadvantaging the coming generations. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4198;left:658"><nobr>Hence, the conjunction of the (potentially) productive nature of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4219;left:658"><nobr>capital investment and of the indefinite nature of the number of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4239;left:658"><nobr>coming generations, is such that in the intergenerational context,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4260;left:658"><nobr>utilitarianism will tend to lead to especially sacrificial outcomes. For</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4280;left:658"><nobr>all those who find the latter unacceptable, justice may then require a</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4301;left:658"><nobr>distributive rather than aggregative approach. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4342;left:658"><nobr><b>Rawlsian </b></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4361;left:658"><nobr><b>Egalitarianism </b></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:4342;left:884"><nobr>Phase 1 DIS PROHIB</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4342;left:1055"><nobr>SAV OBLI </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4382;left:884"><nobr>Phase 2 DIS PROHIB</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4382;left:1055"><nobr>SAV AUTHO</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:4455;left:658"><nobr>Rawls, in his masterpiece <i>A Theory of Justice </i>&lt;8&gt;, is aware of this</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4476;left:658"><nobr>major weakness of utilitarianism. Still, he considers that moving</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4496;left:658"><nobr>away from the initial condition of prehistoric men is necessary for </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:4564;left:760"><nobr>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability : 5 </nobr></div> </span></font> <div style="position:absolute;top:4635;left:0"><hr><table border=0 width=100%><tr><td bgcolor=eeeeee align=right><font face=arial,sans-serif><a name=6><b>Page 6</b></a></font></td></tr></table></div><font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:4742;left:658"><nobr>His theory is not only egalitarian. He is also a liberal, in the sense </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4762;left:658"><nobr>that pursuing the improvement of the least well off s situation has</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4783;left:658"><nobr>to be done within the constraints we refer to as « basic liberties ». In</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4803;left:658"><nobr>other words, there is a priority of guaranteeing basic liberties such </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4824;left:658"><nobr>as physical integrity or freedom of expression, over the goal of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4844;left:658"><nobr>improving the socio-economic situation of the least well off. We </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4865;left:658"><nobr>could thus say that if violating the egalitarian goal is acceptable </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4885;left:658"><nobr>during the accumulation phase, it is only so as long as we need to</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4906;left:658"><nobr>set up institutions capable of defending people s basic liberties, this </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4926;left:658"><nobr>latter objective being granted priority over the egalitarian one. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4947;left:658"><nobr>Moreover, if we can show empirically that the richer a democratic </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4967;left:658"><nobr>state is (in terms of GDP) the longer its democratic nature is likely </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4988;left:658"><nobr>to last, we then have an empirical element able to support the claim </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5008;left:658"><nobr>that setting up just institutions requires wealth to have reached a</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5029;left:658"><nobr>sufficient level. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4742;left:106"><nobr>reasons of justice. In order to accommodate both concerns, he ends</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4762;left:106"><nobr>up with a two-stage model in which a steady state stage follows an </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4783;left:106"><nobr>accumulation phase. During the accumulation period, the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4803;left:106"><nobr>intergenerational principle is identical to the utilitarian one </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4824;left:106"><nobr>(compulsory savings). This stage is supposed to have a limited</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4844;left:106"><nobr>duration though. And the goal underlying such a need for </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4865;left:106"><nobr>accumulation has nothing to do with maximizing the size of the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4885;left:106"><nobr>intergenerational utility pie. Rather, for Rawls, the accumulation </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4906;left:106"><nobr>stage aims at allowing for economic wealth to be such that a</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4926;left:106"><nobr>minimum stability of just institutions is guaranteed. As soon as this </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4947;left:106"><nobr>point is reached, accumulation ceases being compulsory. We then </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4967;left:106"><nobr>enter the steady-state stage in which the Rawlsian principle is </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:4988;left:106"><nobr>identical this time to the one defended by theories of indirect</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5009;left:106"><nobr>reciprocity or collective property. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5049;left:106"><nobr>With Rawls, we believe that such a « two stage » model is needed. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5070;left:106"><nobr>And we also think that he is right in defending compulsory savings</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5090;left:106"><nobr>during the accumulation phase. The legitimacy of the latter view is </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5111;left:106"><nobr>not self-evident however. What is potentially shocking for an</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5131;left:106"><nobr>egalitarian like Rawls is to propose  for the accumulation phase  a </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5152;left:106"><nobr>principle of compulsory savings that clearly violates a concern for </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5172;left:106"><nobr>the least well off. As a matter of fact, it is clearly unfair, from an </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5193;left:106"><nobr>egalitarian viewpoint, to require savings from the first generations.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5214;left:106"><nobr>For such a requirement brings about an intergenerational world in </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5234;left:106"><nobr>which the least well off (generation) is not in the best possible</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5254;left:106"><nobr>situation (since if it did not have to save, it would end up being </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5275;left:106"><nobr>much better off). Limiting ourselves to a prohibition on dis-savings </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5296;left:106"><nobr>would not have such consequences. Again, Rawls is aware of this</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5316;left:106"><nobr>problem. And still, he sticks to compulsory savings during that </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5337;left:106"><nobr>stage. Let us provide here a short defence of his view along </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5357;left:106"><nobr>Rawlsian lines. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5070;left:658"><nobr><b>Luck Egalitarianism </b></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5070;left:884"><nobr>Phase 1 </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:5070;left:950"><nobr>DIS PROHIB SAV OBLI </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:5091;left:884"><nobr>Phase 2</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:5091;left:950"><nobr>DIS PROHIB </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5110;left:950"><nobr>unless& </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5091;left:1055"><nobr>SAV PROHIB</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5110;left:1055"><nobr>unless& </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:5181;left:658"><nobr>While agreeing with the idea of a « two stages » theory and with the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5201;left:658"><nobr>principle Rawls defends for the accumulation phase, we disagree</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5222;left:658"><nobr>with the principle he proposes for the steady-state stage. For we</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5242;left:658"><nobr>think egalitarians should defend a different principle at that stage.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5263;left:658"><nobr>Which one ? Rather than just prohibiting dissavings, egalitarians </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5283;left:658"><nobr>should also call for a <i>prohibition </i>on savings. This position may seem</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5304;left:658"><nobr>absurd at first. For what would be morally wrong with a generation </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5324;left:658"><nobr>of parents voluntarily tightening up their belts in order to guarantee </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5345;left:658"><nobr>their children a better existence than the one they have been able to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5365;left:658"><nobr>benefit from. Towards whom would that be unfair ? Here is the</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:5456;left:760"><nobr>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability : 6 </nobr></div> </span></font> <div style="position:absolute;top:5527;left:0"><hr><table border=0 width=100%><tr><td bgcolor=eeeeee align=right><font face=arial,sans-serif><a name=7><b>Page 7</b></a></font></td></tr></table></div><font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:5634;left:106"><nobr>answer : towards the least well off members of these parents </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5654;left:106"><nobr>generation.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5695;left:106"><nobr>For let us envisage the case of a generation anticipating that, at the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5716;left:106"><nobr>end of its existence, it may end up having transferred a surplus to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5736;left:106"><nobr>the next generation, i.e. more (per head) than what it inherited from</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5757;left:106"><nobr>the previous one. The point here is that such a surplus should </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5777;left:106"><nobr>benefit the least well off members of the current generation rather</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5798;left:106"><nobr>than the next generation as a whole. Transferring more to the future </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5818;left:106"><nobr>will sacrifice as much for today s least well off people. And it is only </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5839;left:106"><nobr>as long as each generation sticks to a prohibition on both </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5859;left:106"><nobr>(intergenerational) dissavings and savings that the intergenerational </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5880;left:106"><nobr>world we are bringing about will be the one in which the least well </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5901;left:106"><nobr>off, whatever the generation they belong to, are less disadvantaged </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5921;left:106"><nobr>than they could ever be in a world differently organised. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5941;left:106"><nobr>Admittedly, were such a surplus to be transferred to the next </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5962;left:106"><nobr>generation, it could very well benefit its least advantaged members. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5982;left:106"><nobr>We need to make sure however that the least well off members of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6003;left:106"><nobr>our own generation do not then end up with a situation worse than </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6023;left:106"><nobr>the one of those least advantaged members of the next generation.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6044;left:106"><nobr>Hence, our closed principle (neither savings, nor dis-savings) </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6085;left:106"><nobr>It will not be possible to discuss here the details of this proposal.</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:8px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6087;left:599"><nobr><a href="#7">5</a></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6106;left:106"><nobr>What needs to be stressed however is that if long term growth is </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6126;left:106"><nobr>only possible if at least some generations will have transferred to</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6146;left:106"><nobr>the next ones more than they had themselves inherited, the idea of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6167;left:106"><nobr>prohibition on savings also entails that <i>growth </i>should in principle be </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6188;left:106"><nobr>regarded as intergenerationally unjust. This is one among several</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6208;left:106"><nobr>possible « anti-growth » arguments.</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:8px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6210;left:378"><nobr><a href="#7">6</a></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6208;left:393"><nobr>It is important to see how</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6229;left:106"><nobr>distinctive it is. Let us mention four such « anti-growth » </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5634;left:658"><nobr>arguments, each of them being different from the one defended</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5654;left:658"><nobr>here. According to the first one, insofar as growth would increase </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5675;left:658"><nobr>intragenerational </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5675;left:818"><nobr><i>inequalities</i></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5675;left:929"><nobr>(both </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5675;left:1001"><nobr>domestically </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5675;left:1129"><nobr>and</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5695;left:658"><nobr>internationally), it would have to be rejected for that (strict </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5716;left:658"><nobr>egalitarian) reason. According to a second argument, found in</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5736;left:658"><nobr>Bonin &lt;10&gt;, a state taking measures to boost growth would violate</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5757;left:658"><nobr>the <i>neutrality </i>constraint, according to which public authorities </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5777;left:658"><nobr>should remain as neutral as possible towards people s various </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5798;left:658"><nobr>conceptions of the good life. As to the third argument, it says that</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5818;left:658"><nobr>growth is <i>vain</i>, if not counter-productive, from the point of view of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5839;left:658"><nobr>conceptions of the good life that are really worth it. We would not </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5859;left:658"><nobr>need so much material wealth per head to be able to lead a happy</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5880;left:658"><nobr>life. Finally, a fourth argument considers growth, insofar as it </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5901;left:658"><nobr>mobilizes large amounts of physical resources, as <i>unsustainable </i>at </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5921;left:658"><nobr>the current rate. Each of these arguments would deserve closer </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5941;left:658"><nobr>scrutiny, both on their normative assumptions and on their </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5962;left:658"><nobr>empirical plausibility. Notice moreover that only the two first ones </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:5982;left:658"><nobr>are justice-based ones, as is our intergenerational anti-growth</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6003;left:658"><nobr>argument here. Still, it is now clear that the « anti-growth » </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6023;left:658"><nobr>argument we are defending differs from the four ones we have just</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6044;left:658"><nobr>presented. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6085;left:658"><nobr>What is also worth stressing is that we end up with an egalitarian</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6106;left:658"><nobr>theory whose implications for the steady-state stage <i>do not converge</i></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6126;left:658"><nobr>with the ones of the indirect reciprocity or of the collective property</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6146;left:658"><nobr>views. Moreover, there is another angle from which the proposed</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6167;left:658"><nobr>theory is different from those two views. Let us consider the case of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6188;left:658"><nobr>a future natural phenomenon such as an Earthquake, adversely </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6208;left:658"><nobr>affecting the situation of the next generation. From an intra-</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6229;left:658"><nobr>generational perspective, an Earthquake is generally expected to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6249;left:658"><nobr>give rise to compensatory measures funded by society as a whole to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6270;left:658"><nobr>the benefit of those unlucky people who are especially affected, due</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6290;left:658"><nobr>to no fault of their own. For luck egalitarians consider that any </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:7px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6278;left:106"><nobr>5</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6276;left:115"><nobr>For further developments : &lt;9&gt;, chap. 4 </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:7px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6296;left:106"><nobr>6</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6295;left:115"><nobr>See <i>Ibidem </i>, pp. 224-225</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6348;left:760"><nobr>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability : 7 </nobr></div> </span></font> <div style="position:absolute;top:6419;left:0"><hr><table border=0 width=100%><tr><td bgcolor=eeeeee align=right><font face=arial,sans-serif><a name=8><b>Page 8</b></a></font></td></tr></table></div><font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6526;left:106"><nobr>disadvantage resulting from someone s circumstances (as opposed </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6546;left:106"><nobr>to her choices) should be fully compensated by the rest of society. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6567;left:106"><nobr>Why would this not be the case in the intergenerational context as</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6587;left:106"><nobr>well ? </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6628;left:106"><nobr>If we were able to predict  by extraordinary means  the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6649;left:106"><nobr>occurrence and importance of such future Earthquakes and if we </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6669;left:106"><nobr>could show that the next generation is especially likely to be</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6690;left:106"><nobr>negatively affected, to a much larger extent than us who  ex </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6710;left:106"><nobr>hypothesi  would not have to suffer any Earthquake, then we</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6731;left:106"><nobr>would have to switch from a prohibition on savings (the principle) </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6751;left:106"><nobr>to an obligation to save (one of the exceptions to this principle). And </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6772;left:106"><nobr>we would have to save to such an extent that the next generation </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6793;left:106"><nobr>would not end up with circumstances worse than the ones we will </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6813;left:106"><nobr>end up having come across. Such compulsory savings in case of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6833;left:106"><nobr>anticipatable future adverse circumstances affecting the next</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6854;left:106"><nobr>generation correspond with a rationale very different from the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6874;left:106"><nobr>utilitarian one or from the one Rawlsians could provide for the</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6895;left:106"><nobr>accumulation phase. Moreover, it does not seem that indirect </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6915;left:106"><nobr>reciprocity theory would ever be able to justify such an obligation to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6936;left:106"><nobr>save (in the intergenerational sense again) for that clearly entails </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6956;left:106"><nobr>that we should transfer <i>more </i>to the next generation than what we </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6977;left:106"><nobr>received from the previous one. The same remark holds as well </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6998;left:106"><nobr>towards the idea of intergenerational collective property. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7128;left:106"><nobr>Having surveyed different theories of intergenerational justice and </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7149;left:106"><nobr>having indicated the reasons why we believe the luck egalitarian </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7169;left:106"><nobr>one supports principles that are both clearly distinct and defensible, </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6526;left:658"><nobr>let us now turn to Brundtland s definition of sustainable</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6546;left:658"><nobr>development. Our claim is that such a definition is insufficient in</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6567;left:658"><nobr>two respects if we adopt a luck egalitarian point of view. A word of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6587;left:658"><nobr>caution however : neither do we claim that the Brundtland report </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6608;left:658"><nobr>provides us with the only possible definition of sustainability,</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:8px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6610;left:1121"><nobr><a href="#8">7</a></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6608;left:1132"><nobr>nor</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6628;left:658"><nobr>do we claim that the Brundtlandian principle as stated hereinafter </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6649;left:658"><nobr>does full justice to the complexity of her views. The only point here </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6669;left:658"><nobr>is that this principle as so often mobilized in the scientific literature</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6690;left:658"><nobr>and in political discourse falls short for two reasons based on what </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6710;left:658"><nobr>luck egalitarians believe would be the right view of</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6731;left:658"><nobr>intergenerational justice. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6772;left:658"><nobr>Let us state then Brundtland s principle of sustainability : </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6793;left:658"><nobr>« Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6813;left:658"><nobr>the present without compromising the ability of future generations </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6833;left:658"><nobr>to meet their own needs ».</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:8px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6835;left:858"><nobr><a href="#8">8</a></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:6833;left:869"><nobr>The concept of needs can of course be </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6854;left:658"><nobr>understood in a more or less broad sense. Even if we do not </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6874;left:658"><nobr>consider it as necessarily equivalent to the idea of « basic need »,</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6895;left:658"><nobr>there remains certainly an idea that the scope of our needs could not </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6915;left:658"><nobr>meaningfully be taken in an extremely broad way, and that once</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6936;left:658"><nobr>coverage for each one s needs is being provided for, justice will not</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6956;left:658"><nobr>require any further redistribution. This becomes clear once we stick </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6977;left:658"><nobr>to a concept of basic needs and ask  to take an intragenerational </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:6998;left:658"><nobr>example again - whether someone with one finger missing due to </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7018;left:658"><nobr>genetic malformation would deserve any compensation on grounds </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7038;left:658"><nobr>of justice, knowing that she would be perfectly capable of leading a </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7059;left:658"><nobr>minimally flourishing life without such a compensation. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7080;left:658"><nobr>Sufficientarians (i.e. those claiming that once coverage for needs is </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7100;left:658"><nobr>provided for, no further redistribution is required) will claim that </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7121;left:658"><nobr>no compensation should be expected. Luck egalitarians will </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7038;left:106"><nobr><b>Brundtland s Sufficientarianism </b></nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:7038;left:383"><nobr>DIS AUTHO </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7057;left:383"><nobr>unless& </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7038;left:499"><nobr>SAV AUTHO</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7057;left:499"><nobr>unless& </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:7px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:7170;left:658"><nobr>7</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:7168;left:667"><nobr>See e.g. &lt;11&gt;</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=2 face="Times"><span style="font-size:7px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:7188;left:658"><nobr>8</nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:7187;left:667"><nobr>&lt;1&gt;, at p. 43 </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7240;left:760"><nobr>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability : 8 </nobr></div> </span></font> <div style="position:absolute;top:7311;left:0"><hr><table border=0 width=100%><tr><td bgcolor=eeeeee align=right><font face=arial,sans-serif><a name=9><b>Page 9</b></a></font></td></tr></table></div><font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:14px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:7418;left:106"><nobr>certainly disagree - at least in some cases - insofar as the handicap at </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7438;left:106"><nobr>stake is strictly the result of this person s circumstances. This </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7459;left:106"><nobr>illustrates the central difference between both views. If we adopt, </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7479;left:106"><nobr>e.g., a welfarist metric, for sufficientarians, as long as each of us is</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7500;left:106"><nobr>able to reach a given threshold of well-being, justice does not</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7520;left:106"><nobr>require any further redistribution. In contrast, luck egalitarians will </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7541;left:106"><nobr>only stop calling for further redistribution once all disadvantages </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7561;left:106"><nobr>due to brute bad luck will have been compensated for by society as </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7582;left:106"><nobr>a whole. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7623;left:106"><nobr>Hence, for luck egalitarians, Brundtland s sufficientarianism is</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7643;left:106"><nobr>unable to exclude two types of behaviours that should be regarded</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7664;left:106"><nobr>as unfair. First, it <i>allows </i>a possibly significant degree of dissavings </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7685;left:106"><nobr>as long as there remains a significant margin once we have ensured</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7705;left:106"><nobr>for the capacity of the next generation to provide for its own (basic) </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7725;left:106"><nobr>needs. Such dis-savings would not be deemed acceptable by </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7746;left:106"><nobr>Rawlsian </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7746;left:200"><nobr>or </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7746;left:241"><nobr>luck </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7746;left:299"><nobr>egalitarians. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7746;left:413"><nobr>Second, </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7746;left:496"><nobr>by </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7746;left:541"><nobr>allowing </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7766;left:106"><nobr>(intergenerational) savings as long as this does not jeopardize the </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7787;left:106"><nobr>ability of the current generation to provide for its own needs, such </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7807;left:106"><nobr>sufficientarianism would violate the egalitarian principle of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7828;left:106"><nobr>prohibition on savings. Hence, all those who generally take </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7848;left:106"><nobr>seriously the intuitions of luck egalitarianism should not abandon </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7869;left:106"><nobr>them once they are dealing with intergenerational issues. And if </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7890;left:106"><nobr>they don t, they should see that such a view certainly advocates</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7910;left:106"><nobr>principles that are in two important respects very different from</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7930;left:106"><nobr>Brundtland s sufficientarianism. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7971;left:106"><nobr><b>Conclusion</b></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8012;left:106"><nobr>This short paper was based on a set of simplifying assumptions. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8032;left:106"><nobr>Population was assumed to remain constant. The composition of </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8053;left:106"><nobr>the basket of goods to be transferred to the next generation was left </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8073;left:106"><nobr>undiscussed. Uncertainty problems were left aside as well. We just </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7418;left:658"><nobr>looked at intergenerational transfers from a purely quantitative </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7438;left:658"><nobr>point of view, using two categories (savings/dissavings) and three</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7459;left:658"><nobr>modalities (prohibition, authorisation and obligation). Still, with</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7479;left:658"><nobr>such assumptions in mind, it is fascinating to see that, based on </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7500;left:658"><nobr>some of our standard theories of justice, we can uncover very </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7520;left:658"><nobr>different logics of intergenerational justice and separate out clearly </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7541;left:658"><nobr>distinct operational principles corresponding to such logics. Such an</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7561;left:658"><nobr>analysis also helps us to see that for a luck egalitarian, Brundtland s</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7582;left:658"><nobr>sufficientarian principle does not allow us to exclude what can be </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7602;left:658"><nobr>seen as two major intergenerational injustices. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7643;left:658"><nobr>References </nobr></div> </span></font> <font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:7684;left:658"><nobr>&lt;1&gt; G. H. Brundtland <i>et al. </i>, <i>Our Common Future</i>,: Oxford University Press, </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7703;left:658"><nobr>Oxford/New York (1987), 400 p.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7740;left:658"><nobr>&lt;2&gt; B. Barry, « Justice as Reciprocity », in <i>Liberty and Justice</i>, Oxford </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7759;left:658"><nobr>University Press, Oxford (1989) 211-241 </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7796;left:658"><nobr>&lt;3&gt; A. Masson, « Quelle solidarité intergénérationnelle ? », <i>Notes de la </i></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7815;left:658"><nobr><i>Fondation Saint Simon </i>(Paris) (1999), issue 103 </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7852;left:658"><nobr>&lt;4&gt; K. A. Wade-Benzoni, « A Golden Rule Over Time : Reciprocity in </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7871;left:658"><nobr>Intergenerational Allocation Decisions », <i>Academy of Management Journal</i></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7889;left:658"><nobr>45/5 (2002) 1011-1028</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7927;left:658"><nobr>&lt;5&gt; <B><span class="goohl0">D. Cosandey</span></B>, <i>La faillite coupable des retraites. Comment nos assurances</i></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7945;left:658"><nobr><i>vieillesse font chuter la natalité </i>, L Harmattan, Paris (2003), 164 p.</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:7983;left:658"><nobr>&lt;6&gt; J. Locke, <i>Two Treatises of Government </i>, Cambridge University Press, </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8001;left:658"><nobr>Cambridge (1690) 1967 (Laslett ed.). </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8039;left:658"><nobr>&lt;7&gt; L. Bourgeois, <i>Solidarité</i>, Armand Colin, Paris (1902) </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8132;left:760"><nobr>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability : 9 </nobr></div> </span></font> <div style="position:absolute;top:8203;left:0"><hr><table border=0 width=100%><tr><td bgcolor=eeeeee align=right><font face=arial,sans-serif><a name=10><b>Page 10</b></a></font></td></tr></table></div><font size=3 face="Times"><span style="font-size:13px;font-family:Times"> <div style="position:absolute;top:9024;left:752"><nobr>The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland s Sustainability : 10</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8310;left:106"><nobr>&lt;8&gt; J. Rawls, <i>A Theory of Justice </i>(revised edition), Oxford University Press, </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8328;left:106"><nobr>Oxford (1999), 538 p. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8366;left:106"><nobr>&lt;9&gt; A. Gosseries, <i>Penser la justice entre les générations. De l affaire Perruche à </i></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8384;left:106"><nobr><i>la réforme des <B><span class="goohl2">retraites</span></B></i>, Aubier-Flammarion, Paris (2004), 320 p. </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8422;left:106"><nobr>&lt;10&gt; P.-Y. Bonin, « Neutralité libérale et croissance économique », <i>Dialogue</i></nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8440;left:106"><nobr>36 (1997) 683-703 </nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8478;left:106"><nobr>&lt;11&gt; J. Pezzey &amp; M. Toman, « Introduction » in Pezzey &amp; Toman (eds.),</nobr></div> <div style="position:absolute;top:8496;left:106"><nobr><i>The Economics of Sustainability</i>, Ashgate, Aldershot (2002) xi-xxxii</nobr></div> </span></font> </body> </html>